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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Daniel William Leary appeals from the district court's order 
probation and ordering his sentence executed. Leary contends the district court 
erred in denying his request for credit for time served as part of drug court. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In November 2011, the state filed a criminal complaint charging Leary with 
felony possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.12-13.) In February 2012, 
Leary pied guilty (R., p.44), and in May 2012, the court entered judgment, 
imposing a unified seven-year sentence with two and one-half years fixed, but 
retained jurisdiction (R., pp.53-55). At the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction 
review period, the court suspended Leary's sentence and placed him on 
probation. (R., pp.64-69.) 
Less than three months later, the state filed a Motion for Bench Warrant 
for Probation Violation, alleging numerous probation violations. (R., pp.71-74.) 
Leary was arrested on that warrant on December 7, 2012. (R., p.92.) Leary 
subsequently admitted violating several terms of his probation and the court 
revoked his probation, ordered his sentence executed and retained jurisdiction, 
at the end of which the court reinstated Leary on probation. (R., pp.107-108, 
116-117 .) 
Approximately seven months later, the state filed another motion for 
probation violation. (R., pp.131-133.) Leary admitted two of the alleged 
violations and the court ordered that he be screened for participation in drug 
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court. (R., p.151.) On February 21, 2014, the district court entered an Order 
Reinstating, Amending, and Extending Probation. (R., pp.156-157.) Included in 
that order was a requirement that Leary "successfully complete" drug court as a 
condition of probation. (R., p.157.) The order further provided that Leary "may 
be required to serve an additional ninety (90) days in the Ada County Jail at the 
discretion of his probation officer" and authorized "[t]he Drug Court Judge [to) 
also order [Leary] to serve up to ninety (90) days in the Ada County Jail." (R., 
p.157.) Leary began participating in drug court on February 26, 2014. (See R., 
pp.157, 161-165.) 
On March 4, 2014, the presiding drug court judge issued a Drug Court 
Bench Warrant after Leary failed to appear. (R., p.170.) Leary was arrested on 
the warrant on May 15, 2014. (R., p.170.) Leary was in custody on the May 15 
warrant until August 6, 2014, in order to complete the ABC program. (See R., 
p.172 (drug court minutes indicate Leary in custody on May 20, 2014), p.173 
(drug court minutes from June 10, 2014, contain no information on custody 
status, but note "ABC"), p.179 (drug court minutes indicate Leary in custody on 
August 5, 2014, and released "morning 8-6-14"); Tr., p.8, Ls.19-24 (recitation of 
drug court history).) 
A second Drug Court Bench Warrant was issued on August 12, 2014, 
after Leary again failed to appear. (R., pp.183-184.) Leary was arrested on the 
August 12 warrant on November 11, 2014. (R., p.184.) On November 18, 2014, 
the state filed a motion to discharge Leary from drug court and a motion for a 
bench warrant based on allegations that Leary violated his probation. (R., 
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pp.188-190, 194-196.) Leary was arrested on the bench warrant on November 
20, 2014. (R., pp.199-200.) 
On November 26, 2014, Leary admitted the allegations in the discharge 
motion, agreed to be discharged from drug court, and admitted he violated his 
probation. (R., p.202.) At the disposition hearing held on March 18, 2015, Leary 
made a verbal request for "credit for time served on any warrant that he served 
on -- including that drug court warrant." (Tr., p.12, Ls.17-19; see also p.10, L.19 
-p.11, L.4 (requesting credit for time served on May drug court warrant).) In 
response, the court advised Leary it would give him credit "for the days that were 
served prior to entry of this judgment," but told Leary he would not receive "credit 
for any days that were served as a condition of [his] probation." (Tr., p.15, Ls.8-
11.) The court further stated: "So we'll look at it and make sure that we give you 
credit for the times that were under a motion for discharge or a motion for a 
bench warrant." (Tr., p.15, Ls.11-14.) 
On March 19, 2015, the court entered an order revoking Leary's probation 
and ordering his sentence executed. (R., pp.207-209.) The court's March 19 
revocation order awarded Leary 526 days of credit for time served, "which 
includes any time served on a prior retained jurisdiction." (R., p.208 (emphasis 
omitted).) The amount of credit awarded in the court's March 19 revocation 
order was an additional 121 days above what Leary was given in the prior 
February 21 order that reinstated him on probation and required him to complete 
drug court. (Compare R., p.157 (405 days credit) with p.208 (526 days credit).) 
Leary filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.211-212.) 
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ISSUE1 
states on as: 
Did the district court err when it calculated the credit time 
to which Mr. Leary was entitled? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Should this Court reject Leary's claim that the district court erred in failing 
to give him credit for time served pursuant to statutory language that did not exist 
at the time the court entered judgment and does not retroactively apply to the 
court's order? 
1 The state notes this same issue has been raised in State v. Taylor, Docket No. 
42774. 
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ARGUMENT 
Leary Has Failed To Show The District Court's Calculation Of Credit For Time 
Served Was Erroneous Based On Statutory Amendments That Were Not 
Effective When The Court Made The Calculation And That Are Not Retroactive 
A Introduction 
Leary contends the district court erred by not giving him credit for time 
served pursuant to statutory language that was not in effect when the court 
considered his request. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-15.) According to Leary, despite 
the non-existence of the statutory language upon which he relies, the court 
nevertheless erred because the July 2015 amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 
19-2603 "are retroactive and require the district court to give [him] credit for all 
the time served on the drug court bench warrants as a condition of probation." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Leary is incorrect because his argument - that the 
legislature intended to render illegal all previously imposed sentences in which 
credit for time served as a condition of probation was not granted - is meritless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts "defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial 
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous." 
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State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Leary's Claim That The Amendments To I.C. §§ 18-309 And 19-2603 
Should Be Given Retroactive Effect Is Meritless 
Leary concedes, as he must, that the relevant statues in effect when the 
district court entered its March 19 order granting him credit for 526 days2 did not 
permit credit for time served as a condition of probation. (Appellant's Brief, p.9 
2 Leary asserts that the additional 121 days of credit reflected in the court's 
March 19 revocation order "appears to credit [him] for the 119 days he served on 
the probation violation bench warrant between November 20, 2014 and March 
18, 2015" and for "two days of the nine-day period he served on the second drug 
court bench warrant between November 11 and November 20, 2014." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Based on this interpretation, Leary contends he is 
entitled to "the 84 days he served on the first drug court bench warrant, as well 
as the other seven days he served on the second drug court bench warrant," 
which he claims he requested at the disposition hearing. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) 
First, Leary did not request credit for both drug court warrants. He requested 
credit for "that drug court warrant," which specifically referred to the warrant 
issued in May on which he served "about two and a half months in custody." 
(Tr., p.10, L.19 - p.11, L.4, p.12, Ls.17-19.) Second, it is unlikely the district 
court randomly gave Leary credit for two of the nine days on the August drug 
court warrant, as Leary claims. In fact, to do so would be inconsistent with the 
court's correct position that such time was not properly credited under existing 
law. The record shows that the additional 121 days for which Leary received 
credit was based on the 121 days (inclusive) from the November 18, 2014 
motion for bench warrant for probation violation and motion for discharge, and 
the March 18 disposition. (See Tr., p.15, Ls.11-14 (court noting Leary would 
receive credit for time "under a motion for discharge or a motion for a bench 
warrant").) 
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("Under Idaho precedent existing at the revocation hearing in this case, 
defendants were not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of 
probation.").) As such, his argument on appeal relies solely on the assertion that 
the July 2015 amendments to LC. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 are retroactive. This 
argument fails. 
"In general, legislation acts prospectively" and "retrospective or retroactive 
legislation is not favored." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937, 318 P.3d 918, 
927 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted). "As such, a well-settled and 
fundamental rule of statutory construction is to construe statutes to have a 
prospective rather than retroactive effect." ~ As amended effective July 1, 
2015, I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 provide that a defendant will receive credit for 
time served as a condition of probation. I.C. § 67-510 (governing effective date 
of amendments). This newly-enacted language "is not applied retroactively 
unless there is clear legislative intent to that effect." Piercy, 155 Idaho at 937-
938, 318 P.3d at 927-928 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted). Such clear 
intent may be found either by an express statement of retroactivity or in the 
language of the statute requiring retroactive application. 1st at 938, 318 P.3d at 
928. "A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts 
antecedent to its enactment" but is retroactive if it "changes the legal effect of 
previous transactions or events." Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 
313, 48 P.3d 636,642 (2002). 
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The statutory language in the amendments shows that the legislature 
intended the amendments to apply at the time the courl calculates time served 
upon imposing judgment. The amendment to I. C. § 18-309 provides: 
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been 
withheld and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and 
is later imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered 
or imposed shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of 
incarceration served as a condition of probation under the original 
withheld or suspended judgment. 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 1, p. 240 (emphasis added). As the italicized 
language indicates, under the plain language of the amendment, the time the 
statute applies is upon entry of judgment after the probation violation has been 
found. Likewise, the amended I.C. § 19-2603 provides: 
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and 
conditions of probation, it may ... revoke probation. The defendant 
shall receive credit for time served . . . for any time served as a 
condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended 
sentence. 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 2, p. 240 (emphasis added). Again, the 
contemplated time-frame for the awarding of credit for time served is at the time 
the court revokes probation. 
Nothing in the statutes as they existed or as amended suggests a 
legislative intent to render illegal prior calculations of time served. Rather, the 
statutes evince a clear intent that the amendments should apply only to those 
calculations of time served made after the amendments were effective. In this 
case, the district court entered its order revoking probation on March 19, 2015, 
more than three months before the amendments became effective. (R., p.207.) 
Nothing in the amendments indicates a legislative intent to render any part of 
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that order retroactively illegal or erroneous. Because the amount of credit for 
time served was calculated before the amendments, those amendments are 
simply irrelevant to this appeal. 
Because Leary has failed to show the amendments he relies on were in 
any way applicable to legal proceedings concluded before the amendments were 
effective, he has failed to show error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
March 19, 2015 Order Revoking Probation and Imposing Sentence. 
DATED this ih day of October, 2015. 
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